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1. Introduction
Epstein (2006) models an agent who does not update according to Bayes’ Rule, but is
self-aware and anticipates her updating behavior when formulating plans. He provides
axiomatic foundations for his model in the form of a representation theorem for suit-
ably deﬁned preferences such that both the prior and the way in which it is updated are
subjective. The model is nested in a three-period framework, where the agent updates
once and consumption occurs only at the terminal time. This paper extends the model
to an inﬁnite horizon setting, thereby enabling it to address dynamic issues and making
it more amenable to applications.
The benchmark for the present model is the standard speciﬁcation of utility in dy-
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where c = (c) is a consumption process,  and u have the familiar interpretations,
and Et denotes the expectation operator associated with a subjective prior updated by
Bayes’ Rule. Our model generalizes (1), to which it reduces when updating conforms to
Bayes’ Rule.
ThemodelsharessomesimilaritieswiththeGulandPesendorfer(2001,2004)model
of temptation and self-control.1 While these authors (henceforth GP) focus on behav-
ior associated with non-geometric discounting, we adapt their approach to model non-
Bayesian updating. The connection drawn here between temptation and updating is
as follows: at period t, the agent has a prior view of the relationship between the next
observation st+1 and the future uncertainty (st+2,st+3,...) that she considers ‘correct.’
But after observing a particular realization st+1, she changes her view on the noted re-
lationship. For example, she may respond exuberantly to a good (or bad) signal after it
is realized and decide that it is an even better (or worse) signal about future states than
she had thought ex ante. She tries to resist the temptation to behave in accordance with
the newview rather thanin accordance withthe viewshe considers correct. Temptation
mightberesistedbutatacost. Thussheactsasthoughformingacompromiseposterior
belief; it differs from what would be implied by Bayesian updating of the original prior
and in that sense reﬂects non-Bayesian updating. The exuberant agent described above
would appear to an outside observer as someone who overreacts to data.
An important feature of our model from the point of view of applications is its rich-
ness: just as the Savage and Anscombe–Aumann theorems provide foundations for sub-
jective expected utility theory without restricting beliefs, the present framework im-
poses a speciﬁc structure for preferences without unduly restricting the nature of up-
dating. We demonstrate richness by describing specializations that capture excessive
weightgiven,attheupdatingstage,topriorbeliefs,oralternatively,totheobserveddata.
In addition, we describe a counterpart of the exchangeable Bayesian learning model.
To illustrate the scope of our framework, consider an agent who is trying to learn the
trueparameterinaset. Updatingofbeliefsinresponsetoobservationss1,...,st, leads
to the process of posteriors ftg, where each t is a probability measure on . Bayesian
updating leads to the process
t+1 = BU(t;st+1),
where BU(t;st+1) denotes the Bayesian update of t. One alternative consistent with
our model is the process
t+1 =(1 t+1)BU(t;st+1)+t+1t,
where t+1  1. If t+1does not depend on the latest observation st+1 and if t+1 > 0,
then the updating rule can be interpreted as attaching too much weight to prior beliefs
t and hence underreacting to observations. Another alternative has the form
t+1 =(1 t+1)BU(t;st+1)+t+1 t+1,
1At a technical level, we rely heavily on generalizations of the Gul–Pesendorfer model proved by Kopylov
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where  0 is a suitable noninformative prior and subsequent  t’s are obtained via
Bayesian updating. This updating rule for the posteriors t can be interpreted (under
the assumptions for t+1 stated above) as attaching too much weight to the sample.2
Several systematic deviations from Bayesian updating have been observed in ex-
perimental psychology; see Tversky and Kahneman (1974) and the surveys by Camerer
(1995)andRabin(1998), forexample. Thisevidencedealswiththeupdatingofobjective
probabilities. Thus models such as Rabin (2002) and Mullainathan (2000), for example,
thataddresstheexperimentalevidencetakeprobabilitiesasdirectlyobservable. Incon-
trast,wefollowtheSavagetraditionandaddresstheseeminglymorerelevantcasewhere
probabilities are subjective; indeed, our model of (or story about) updating, is more in-
tuitive if probabilities are subjective. This forces us to focus on behavior, in the form of
axioms on preferences, that reveals both beliefs and updating. (The cited models that
assume objective probabilities are not explicit about the associated model of choice.)
Though our model does not address the experimental evidence directly, the two never-
theless are related. This is because one suspects that some of the biases noted in the
experimental literature would be exhibited also when updating subjective probabilities,
and because, as will become evident, our framework is rich enough to accommodate a
wide range of deviations from Bayesian updating.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 deﬁnes the formal domain of choice, the
space of contingent menus, and then functional forms for conditional utility functions.
Some specializations corresponding to speciﬁc updating biases and to learning about
parameters are described in Section 3. Finally, axiomatic foundations are provided in
Section 4. Proofs are collected in the Appendix.
2. Utility
2.1 Primitives
Time is discrete and varies over t = 0,1,2,.... Uncertainty is represented by a (ﬁnite)
period state space S, one element of which is realized at each t. Thus the complete
uncertainty is represented by the full state space 1
t=1St, where St =S for all t > 0. The
period consumption space is Ct = C, a compact metric mixture space.3 Though we
often refer to ct in Ct as period t consumption, it is more accurately thought of as a
lottery over period t consumption. Thus we adopt an Anscombe–Aumann style domain
where outcomes are lotteries. Information available at t is given by the history st
1 =




2While this paper focuses on presenting the framework, in Epstein et al. (2008) we apply the framework
to ask: what do non-Bayesian updaters learn? We show, for instance, that multiple repetitions of non-
Bayesian updating rules that underreact to observations uncover the true data generating process with
probability one, while non-Bayesian updaters who overreact can, with positive probability, become certain
that a false parameter is true and thus converge to incorrect forecasts.
3We use this term to include the property that the mixture operation (c,c0,) 7 ! c +(1 )c0 is con-
tinuous with respect to the product metric on C C [0,1].196 Epstein, Noor, and Sandroni Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)
choose (c0,F0) choose (c1,F1)∈ F0(s1) choose (c2,F2)∈ F1(s2)
t =0 t =1 t =2
observe s1 observe s2
Figure 1. The time line.
For any compact metric space X, the set of acts from S into X is XS; it is endowed
with the product topology. A closed (hence compact) subset of C XS is called a menu
(of pairs (c,F), where c 2C and F 2XS). Denote by M(X) the set of all compact subsets
of X, endowed with the Hausdorff metric. Analogously, M(C XS) is the set of menus
of pairs (c,F) as above; it inherits the compact metric property (Aliprantis and Border
1994, Section 3.16).
Consideraphysicalactiontakenattimet, whereconsumptionatt hasalreadybeen
determined. The consequence of that action is a menu, contingent on the state st+1,
of alternatives for t + 1, where these alternatives include both choices to be made at
t +1—namely, the choice of both consumption and also another action. This motivates
identifying each physical action with a contingent menu, denoted F, where
F :S  !M(C C), (2)
and C denotes the space of all contingent menus. The preceding suggests that C can
be identiﬁed with (M(C C))S. Appendix A shows the existence of a (compact metric)




Hence, we identify any element of C with a mapping F as in (2).
ThoughthedomainC istimestationaryandappliesateveryt,whenwewishtoem-
phasize that a particular choice is made at t, we write that the agent chooses contingent
menu Ft 2Ct,
Ft :St+1  !M(Ct+1 Ct+1), (4)
where Ct = Ct+1 = C. (Keep in mind that we have previously deﬁned St+1 = S and
Ct+1 =C.)
The ﬁnal primitive is a process of preference relations (t)1
t=0, one for each time t
and history st
1, where the domain of t isCt Ct. At time 0, the agent uses 0 to choose
(c0,F0) inC0C0. She does this as though anticipating the following: at 1 , a signal s1 is
realized,andthisdeterminesamenuF0(s1)C1C1;attime1,sheupdatesandusesthe
order 1 (which corresponds to the history s1) to choose some (c1,F1) from F0(s1). She
consumesc1 andher(contingent)optionsforthefuturearedescribedby F1. Continuing
inthisway,andgivensomepreviouschoiceofcontingentmenu Ft,sheobservesasignal
st+1,updatesandthenusestheordert+1 (correspondingtothehistory(s1,s2,...,st+1))
to choose some (ct+1,Ft+1) from Ft(st+1). (See Figure 1.)
This completes the description of the primitives and the setting. Before presenting
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At time 0 the agent formulates a prior over the full state space 1
t=1St. She uses this
to evaluate any alternative (c0,F0), which describes contingent options. She is forward-
looking and so her evaluation of (c0,F0) also takes into consideration what choice she
expects to make from F0(s1) at time 1, for each s1. She anticipates that her choice will
be subject to temptation: she will be tempted at that time to deviate from the view of
the world she possesses at time 0, and to use a ‘temptation belief’ to guide her choice.
Depending on how successful she is at exerting self-control, she will end up using a
compromise belief to guide her choice at time 1: this is a mixture of the temptation
belief and the Bayesian update of her time 0 belief. To an outside observer, she is thus
not a Bayesian updater. At time 1 she will be in the same position she was at time 0,
possessing some view of the world and anticipating a struggle at time 2 with temptation
to deviate from this view. So on and so forth for all t.
2.2 Functional form
We describe the representation of (t); axiomatic foundations are deferred to Section 4.
Components of the functional form include: a discount factor 0 <  < 1, u : C  ! R1
linear, continuous, and nonconstant, a probability measure p0 on S1 with full support,
and an adapted process (pt,qt,t)1
t=1, where,4
t 2(0,1], pt,qt 2(St+1), and each pt has full support.








Ut+1(Ft(st+1),st+1)dqt, t >0, (6)




















Then 0 is represented by U0() and for each t > 0, t is represented by tUt() +
(1 t)Vt().
The Bayesian intertemporal utility model (1) is speciﬁed by u, , and a process (pt)
of one-step-ahead conditionals, which determines a unique prior on the full state space
4(S) is the set of probability measures on the ﬁnite setS. A stochastic process (Xt) on 1
1 Sis adapted
if Xt is measurable with respect to the -algebra St that is generated by all sets of the form fs1gfstg
1
t+1S. Below we often write pt() rather than pt( j s
t
1). When we want to emphasize dependence on the
last observation st, we write pt( j st). Similarly, history is suppressed from our notation when we write
Ut(ct,Ft) and Vt(ct,Ft).
5See Theorem 1 for conditions under which utility is well-deﬁned by this recursion.198 Epstein, Noor, and Sandroni Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)
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tion processes given by (1) to contingent menus by assuming that menus are valued ac-
cording to the best alternative they contain (a property termed strategic rationality by
Kreps 1988). In particular, time t conditional beliefs about the future are obtained by
applying Bayes’ Rule to the prior on 1




dating is explained below along with further discussion and interpretation. Sections 3.1
and 3.2 provide several examples. See also Epstein (2006) for discussion in the context
of a three-period model.
2.3 Interpretation
To facilitate interpretation, and also for later purposes, consider some subclasses of Ct.
The contingent menu Ft provides commitment for the next period if Ft(st+1) is a sin-
gleton for each st+1. The set of contingent menus that provide commitment for all fu-
ture periods is denoted by C c
t = C c  C. Each Ft in C c
t determines a unique (random
variable) consumption process cFt = (c
Ft
 )t. If each c
Ft
 is measurable with respect to
information at time t +1, then all uncertainty is resolved next period; the set of all such
contingent menus is C
c,+1
t = C c,+1  C c.6 An example is a (one-step-ahead) bet on
the event G St+1, which pays off with a good deterministic consumption stream if the
state next period lies inG and with a poor one otherwise.
For any ct and contingent menu Ft that provides commitment (Ft 2C c














where cF is the consumption process induced by F as just explained, and P0() is the
unique measure on 1




6See Appendix A for some formal details regarding C c and C c,+1.Theoretical Economics 3 (2008) Non-Bayesian updating: a theoretical framework 199
Thus 0 restricted to C c
0 conforms to subjective expected (intertemporally additive)
utility with prior P0. The ranking of commitment prospects at 0 leaves no choices to be
made later and thus reveals nothing about future updating—P0 reﬂects only an ex ante
view.
To interpret P0 further, consider its one-step-ahead conditionals pt for t  1. Be-
cause these conditional beliefs are formed for contingencies that are ‘distant’ (at least
two periods ahead), they are based on a degree of detachment and objectivity and thus
the agent views them as ‘correct.’7 She continues to view them as correct as time passes.





the Bayesian update of P0. However, as explained shortly, she may update differently
and be led to different posteriors.
Her actual updating underlies the preference t prevailing after an arbitrary history
st
1. By assumption, t is represented by tUt()+(1 t)Vt(). To proceed, deﬁne the





Next, compute that for any ct and any contingent menu Ft 2C c
t that provides commit-














1) is the unique measure on 1






Evidently, at t the agent’s behavior (at least within C c
t ) corresponds to the posterior
Qt( j st
1), and this differs from the period 0 perspective Pt( j st
1). Note thatQt is not the
Bayesian update of P0, nor is it the Bayesian update ofQt 1. The difference between Pt
andQt lies in the way that one-step-ahead beliefs overSt+1 are formulated—the condi-
tional one-step-ahead belief actually adopted at t is mt(), whereas the one that seems
appropriate from the perspective of the initial period is pt().8
7Since p0 is not relevant to the subsequent response to signals, its interpretation is less important here.
See the comments at the end of the section.
8The behavioral meaning of mt is sharper if we restrict attention to contingent menus in C
c,+1
t (pro-
viding perfect commitment and such that all uncertainty resolves at t + 1). Then beliefs about states in
St+2 St+3  are irrelevant, so we conclude that mt guides the ranking of such contingent menus; for
example, it guides the ranking of bets on St+1. Because the ranking of one-step-ahead bets, and more
speciﬁcally the way in which it depends on past observations, is a common and natural way to understand
updating behavior, we refer to mt frequently below when considering more speciﬁc models.200 Epstein, Noor, and Sandroni Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)
The story underlying the noted difference between Pt andQt is as follows: consider
the evaluation of a pair (ct,Ft) in Ct  Ct after having observed the history st
1. The
functions Ut and Vt describe two ways that (ct,Ft) may be evaluated. Both evaluate
immediate consumption ct in the same way, and they discount the expected utility of
the contingent menu Ft in the same way as well. However, they disagree on how to
compute the expected utility of Ft: Ut uses pt and Vt uses qt. The former is the ‘cor-
rect’ one-step-ahead conditional. But in our model, after having observed st
1, the agent
changes her view of the world to the one-step-ahead conditional qt. For instance, if st
1
represents a run of bad signals, she may believe that the likelihood of another bad state
is higher than her ex ante assessment. Alternatively, she may feel that a good signal ‘is
due’ and thus assign it a higher conditional probability than she did when anticipating
possibilities with the cool-headedness afforded by temporal distance. Thus there are
conﬂicting incentives impinging on the agent at t. The period 0 perspective calls for
maximizing Ut, but having seen the sample history st
1 and having changed her view of
the world, she is tempted to maximize Vt. Resisting temptation is costly and she recog-
nizes that the time 0 perspective is ‘correct.’ She is led to compromise and to maximize
tUt()+(1 t)Vt(), the utility function representing t. The corresponding behav-
ior is as though she used the compromise one-step-ahead conditional tpt +(1 t)qt,
which is just mt. The parameter t captures her ability to resist temptation.
The cost of self-control incurred when compromising between Ut() and Vt() is re-
ﬂectednotintherepresentationoft,butratherinthatoft 1,speciﬁcallyintheutility













appearing in (7) can be interpreted as the utility cost of self-control. Thus (7) states that
for any menu Mt received after the history st
1, Ut(Mt,st) is the maximum over Mt of










and that Ut() + ((1   t)=t)Vt() represents t. Thus (7) suggests that choosing the
t-best element in Mt involves incurring a utility cost of self-control.
Unlike a standard agent, our agent may later deviate from her current view of con-
ditional likelihoods. Indeed, she is “dynamically inconsistent” in the sense that she may
not follow through with a committed contingent consumption plan in C c
t if somehow
she has the opportunity to undo previous commitments. Our agent is also self-aware
and forward looking—she anticipates at any time t that she will later adopt conditional
beliefs different from those that seem correct now. Thus she may value commitment: a
smaller menu may be strictly preferable because it could reduce self-control costs.9 In
spite of the value of commitment, the above constitutes a coherent model of dynamic
9Indeed,sincetemptationarisesonlybecauseofnon-Bayesianupdating,theagentexhibitsapreference
for commitment if and only if she is a non-Bayesian updater.Theoretical Economics 3 (2008) Non-Bayesian updating: a theoretical framework 201
choice. Unlike the case in the modeling approach growing out of Strotz (1955), there
is no need to add assumptions about how the agent resolves her intertemporal incon-
sistencies. If you like, these resolutions are already embedded in her utility function
deﬁned on contingent menus. This aspect of the model uses the insight of GP .
A difference from GP is in terms of the primitives of the model. The primitive
adopted by GP , and also by Epstein (2006), is a single preference ordering that describes
choices at one point in time. A story about choices in subsequent periods is only “sug-
gested” by the primitive preference and, in particular, its representation. In our model,
the primitive consists of in-principle-observable preferences in each period.10 Foun-
dations for our model thus specify the testable implications for dynamic choice, as op-
posed to implications only for period 0 preference as in GP and Epstein (2006).
Finally, a comment on the seeming asymmetry in the representations of 0 and t
for t > 0 is in order. The utility function tUt()+(1 t)Vt() for t > 0 makes explicit
the conﬂict experienced by the agent in forming the belief mt over St+1. The repre-
sentation U0() for 0 is agnostic in this regard: it says nothing beyond the fact that at
0 the agent has some belief p0 over S1, which may or may not have been formed after
resolving some conﬂict. Thus the representations tell the same story, except that the
decomposition of p0 into its ‘correct’ and temptation components is not speciﬁed. The
reason for the latter stems from the fact that, as in GP , we take a preference for commit-
ment as the behavioral manifestation of a conﬂict—the decomposition of the belief mt
into its correct ‘pt’ and temptation ‘qt’ components is based on preferences, in partic-
ular on attitudes towards commitment opportunities, prevailing at time t  1. A similar
decomposition of p0 would involve preferences in (unmodeled) periods prior to time
0. The reader should note, however, that p0 is not relevant for understanding updating
behavior, and consequently, its decomposition is of little interest for our purposes.
3. Some specifications
The framework described above is rich. One way to see this is to focus on one-step-
ahead beliefs at any time t +1. As pointed out in the previous section, these are repre-
sented by mt+1 = t+1pt+1 +(1 t+1)qt+1, while Bayesian updating of time t beliefs
would lead to beliefs described by pt+1. Thus, speaking roughly, updating deviates from
Bayes’ Rule in a direction given by qt+1  pt+1 and to a degree determined by t+1, nei-
ther of which is constrained by our framework. Consequently, the modeler is free to
specify the nature and degree of the updating bias, including how these vary with his-
tory, in much the same way that a modeler who works within the Savage or Anscombe–
Aumann framework of subjective expected utility theory is free to specify beliefs as she
sees ﬁt. To illustrate, we describe specializations of the model that impose structure on
updating. Two alternatives are explored, whereby excess weight at the updating stage is
given to either (i) prior beliefs, or (ii) the sample frequency. In both cases, restrictions
are imposed on the relation between qt+1 and pt+1, but not on t+1; thus they limit the
direction but not the magnitude of the updating bias.11 We also consider a speciﬁcation
10In this respect, our model is related to Noor (2008).
11Axiomatic characterizations of these specializations are given in Section 4.2.202 Epstein, Noor, and Sandroni Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)
choose (ct,Ft)∈ Ft−1(st) choose (ct+1,Ft+1)∈ Ft(st+1)
t t +1
observe st observe st+1 observe st+2
Figure 2. The time line.
of our model so as to capture the case where the data generating process is unknown up
to a parameter.
3.1 Updating biases








for some adapted process (t) with t+1  1.12 We use the term (i) positive prior-bias or
(ii) negative prior-bias if (8) is satisﬁed with respectively (i) 0t+1 1 and (ii) t+1 0.
Note that (8) deﬁnes all qt’s inductively given the pt’s and t’s. Thus the corresponding
model of utility is completely speciﬁed by  ,u, p0, and the process (pt,t,t)t1.
Tointerpret(8),thinkoftheagentattimet >0,afterthehistoryst
1 hasbeenrealized,
holding a view about 1
t+1S, and in particular about St+2. On observing the further
realization st+1 at t +1, she forms new beliefs about St+2 by updating this view. (See
Figure2.) Therestriction(8)impliesthatwhenupdating, sheattachesinordinateweight
to prior (time t) beliefs overSt+2.
To see why, recall from the previous section that at t, after the history st
1, the agent’s












represents beliefs aboutSt+2 held at t; refer to it as the prior view ofSt+2 at t, while the
measure pt+1( j st+1) overSt+2 is the Bayesian update of the prior view at t conditional
on observing st+1. If t+1 = 0 or qt+1 = pt+1, then updating consists of responding to
data by applying Bayes’ Rule to the prior view. On the other hand, if t+1 = 1, then





t+1)) is also the posterior,
which gives all the weight to prior beliefs and none to data. Thus an agent who updates
accordingtotheaverageschemein(8)exhibitsapositivebiastothepriorift+1 >0and
a negative bias if t+1 <0.
12When t+1 <0 in (10), qt+1 is well-deﬁned as a probability measure only under special conditions.Theoretical Economics 3 (2008) Non-Bayesian updating: a theoretical framework 203
Though qt+1 leads to urges for making choices at t +1, the agent balances it with
the view represented by pt+1 as described in Section 2.3, and acts as though she forms
the compromise one-step-ahead posterior mt+1 =t+1pt+1+(1 t+1)qt+1. The above









which admits an interpretation analogous to that described above.13
Further content can be introduced into the model described in (8) by imposing
structure on the way in which t+1 depends on the history st+1
1 . For example, it might
depend not only on the empirical frequency of observations but also on their order due
to sensitivity to streaks or other patterns. While each specialization we have described
ﬁxes a sign for t+1 that is constant across times and histories, one can imagine that
an agent might react differently depending on the history. Formulating a theory of the
t+1’s is a subject for future research.
Denote by 	t+1 the empirical frequency measure on S given the history st+1
1 ; that
is, 	t+1(s) is the relative frequency of s in the sample st+1
1 . The second bias, termed
sample-bias, corresponds to the restriction
qt+1(jst+1)=(1 t+1)pt+1(jst+1)+t+1	t+1(), (10)
for some adapted process (t) with t+1  1.14 We use the term (i) positive sample-bias
or (ii) negative sample-bias if (10) is satisﬁed with respectively (i) 0  t+1  1 and (ii)
t+1 0.
The interpretation is similar to that for prior-bias. The implied adjustment rule for
one-step-ahead beliefs is
mt+1 =(1 t+1(1 t+1))pt+1 +t+1(1 t+1)	t+1.
Under positive sample-bias (t+1  0), the Bayesian update pt+1(st+2) is adjusted in
the direction of the sample frequency 	t+1(st+2), implying a bias akin to the hot-hand
fallacy—the tendency to over-predict the continuation of recent observations. For neg-
ative sample-bias,
mt+1 =pt+1 +( t+1(1 t+1))(pt+1  	t+1),
andtheadjustmentisproportionalto(pt+1 	t+1),asthoughexpectingthenextrealiza-
tion to compensate for the discrepancy between pt+1 and the past empirical frequency.
This is a form of negative correlation with past realizations as in the gambler’s fallacy.
13We considered naming these biases underreaction and overreaction respectively, because attaching
too much weight to the prior (as in positive prior-bias) presumably means that in a sense too little weight
is attached to data (and similarly for the other axiom). However, the term underreaction suggests low sen-
sitivity of the posterior to the signal st+1, which need not be the case in (9) unless t+1 and t+1 do not
depend on st+1. See Section 3.2 for more on underreaction and overreaction.
14When t+1 < 0 in (10), qt+1 is well-deﬁned as a probability measure only under special conditions; for
example, it sufﬁces that  t+1=(1 t+1)min
st+2
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In each case the agent is assumed to suffer from the indicated fallacy at all times
and histories. However, it is intuitive that she may move from one fallacy to another
depending on the sample history. Thus one would like a theory that explains which
fallacy applies at each history. Our framework gives this task a concrete form: one must
explain ‘only’ how the weights t+1 vary with history.
Because she uses the empirical frequency measure to summarize past observations,
the temptation facing an agent satisfying sample-bias depends equally on all past ob-
servations, although it might seem more plausible that more recent observations have
a greater impact on temptation. This can be accommodated if 	t+1 is redeﬁned as a





Here s() is the Dirac measure on the observation at time  and w,t+1 0 are weights;
the special case w,t+1 = 1=(t + 1) for all  yields the earlier model. An agent who is
inﬂuenced only by the most recent observation is captured by the law of motion
mt+1 =(1 t+1(1 t+1))pt+1 +t+1(1 t+1)st+1.
If t+1 < 0, the resulting model admits an interpretation (in terms of sampling with-
out replacement from changing urns) analogous to that offered by Rabin (2002) for his
model of the law of small numbers.
3.2 Learning about parameters
This section specializes our model so as to capture the case where the data generating
process is unknown up to a parameter  2. In the benchmark Bayesian model, for any







where `( j ) is a likelihood function (measure on S), 0 represents prior beliefs on ,
andt denotesBayesianposteriorbeliefsabouttheparameterattimet andafterobser-
vations st
1. The de Finetti Theorem shows that beliefs admit such a representation if and
onlyifP0 isexchangeable. Wedescribe(withoutaxiomaticfoundations)ageneralization
of (11) that accommodates non-Bayesian updating.
To accommodate parameters, adopt a suitable speciﬁcation for (pt,qt), taking (t),
, and u as given. We ﬁx (,`,0) and suppose for now that we are also given a process
(t), where each t is a probability measure on . (The -algebra associated with  is
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Proceed by induction: suppose that t has been constructed and deﬁne t+1 by
t+1 =t+1BU(t;st+1)+(1 t+1)t+1, (12)
where BU(t;st+1)() is the Bayesian update of t. This equation constitutes the law of















In light of the discussion in Section 2.3, preferences at t + 1 are based on the beliefs
about parameters represented by t+1. If t+1  1, then (t) is the process of Bayesian
posteriors and the above collapses to the exchangeable model (11).15 More generally,
differencesfromtheBayesianmodeldependon(t),examplesofwhicharegivennext.16
Prior-Bias with Parameters Consider ﬁrst the case where
t+1 =(1 t+1)BU(t;st+1)+t+1t,
where t+1 1. This is readily seen to imply (8) and hence prior-bias; the bias is positive
or negative according to the sign of the ’s. Posterior beliefs about parameters satisfy
the law of motion
t+1 =(1 t+1(1 t+1))BU(t;st+1)+t+1(1 t+1)t.
The latter equation reveals something of how the inferences of an agent with prior-








if and only if t+1`(st+1 j0)<t+1`(st+1 j). (13)
For a concrete example, consider coin tossing, withS = fH,Tg,   (0,1), and `(H j ) =











t+1 is the posterior of a Bayesian who has the same prior at time 0. Similarly,
negative prior-bias leads to overinference.
15Recall that 0 is not deﬁned for the representation.
16One general point is that, in contrast to the exchangeable Bayesian model, t+1 depends not only on
the set of past observations, but also on the order in which they were realized.206 Epstein, Noor, and Sandroni Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)
Sample-Bias with Parameters Learning about parameters is consistent also with
sample-bias. Take as primitive a process ( t+1) of probability measures on  that pro-




Let 0 be given and deﬁne t+1 and t+1 inductively for t 0 by (12) and
t+1 =(1 t+1)BU(t,st+1)+t+1 t+1,
for t+1  1. Then one obtains a special case of sample-bias; the bias is positive or
negative according to the sign of the ’s. The implied law of motion for posteriors is
t+1 =(1 t+1(1 t+1))BU(t;st+1)+t+1(1 t+1) t+1. (15)
To illustrate, suppose that S = fs1,...,s Kg and `(sk j ) = k for each  = (1,...,K)
in , the interior of the K-simplex. Then one can ensure (14) by taking  0 to be a suit-
ablenoninformativeprior;subsequently,Bayesianupdatingleadstothedesiredprocess







yields the Dirichlet posterior with parameter vector (nt(s1),...,nt(s K)), where nt(sk)
















the empirical frequency of sk, as required by (14).















Suppose that all t+1’s are negative (negative sample-bias) and consider the coin-
tossing example. As above, we denote by (B
t ) the Bayesian process of posteriors with
initial prior B
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if st+1




2j, and the common initial prior 0 is uniform.17 After
seeing a string of H’s the agent described herein exaggerates (relative to a Bayesian) the
relative likelihoods of extremely biased coins. If instead we consider a point at which
the history st+1











for any  such that t()>t(1 ). If there have been more realizations of H, then the












that are less biased ( <
1
2). The opposite biases occur in the case of positive sample-
bias.
4. Axiomatic foundations
4.1 The general model
In what follows, states s vary overS, consumption c varies over C, and unless otherwise
speciﬁed, time t varies over 0,1,.... A generic element of Ct  Ct is ft = (ct,Ft); t-
subscripts are dropped where there is no risk of confusion. Denote by [G st+1,M] the
contingent menu in Ct that yieldsG(s0
t+1) if s0
t+1 6= st+1 and M otherwise. The menu M
is identiﬁed with the constant contingent menu that delivers M in all states.
The ﬁrst two axioms are standard.
Axiom 1 (Order). t is complete and transitive.
Axiom 2 (Continuity). Both ff 2Ct Ct : f t gg and ff 2Ct Ct : g t f g are closed.
In Appendix A, we describe a way to mix any two elements in Ct Ct. Thus we can
state the Independence axiom appropriate for our setting.
Axiom 3 (Independence). For every 0<1 and all f and g in Ct Ct,
f t g ()f +(1 )h t g +(1 )h.
The intuition for Independence is similar to that provided in Epstein (2006) for a three-
period setting, and thus we do not elaborate here.
Given two contingent menus F andG in Ct, deﬁne their union statewise, that is,
(F [G)(s)= F(s)[G(s).
The counterpart of GP’s central axiom is the following.
17More generally, the latter two conditions can be replaced by  0(1  0)=((1 ))>0()=0( 0).208 Epstein, Noor, and Sandroni Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)
Axiom 4 (Set-Betweenness). For all states st+1, consumption c 2Ct, and all F and G in
Ct such thatG(s0
t+1)= F(s0
t+1) for all s0
t+1 6=st+1,
(c,F)t (c,G)=)(c,F)t (c,F [G)t (c,G).
Sinceimmediateconsumptionandtheoutcomeinstatesotherthanst+1 isthesame
in all the above rankings, the axiom is essentially a statement about how the agent feels
about receiving the menus F(st+1),G(st+1), or F(st+1)[G(st+1) conditional on st+1. As
a statement about the ranking of menus, Set-Betweenness may be understood as the
behavioral manifestation of temptation and self-control. GP show this in their setting
and Epstein (2006) adapts their interpretation to the domain of (three-period) contin-
gent menus. The ranking of (c,F) and (c,F [G) reveals anticipation of temptation: the
strict preference
(c,F)t (c,F [G) (18)
suggests that the decision-maker prefers that some elements of G(st+1) not be avail-
able as an option conditional on st+1, and presumably this preference for commitment
reveals that she anticipates being tempted by some element of G(st+1) when choosing
from the menu F(st+1)[G(st+1) conditional on st+1. For perspective, note that temp-
tations do not exist for a standard decision-maker who evaluates a menu by its best
element. In particular, she does not exhibit a preference for commitment and satisﬁes
the stronger axiom
F t G =) F t F [G
for all F and G that agree in all but one state s. Following Kreps (1988, Ch. 13), we call
this axiom strategic rationality.
Set-Betweenness allows us to infer the agent’s anticipated time t +1 choices from
menus, for example, whether she expects to succumb to temptation or to exert self-
control. To illustrate, suppose that F = [H st+1,ff g] and G = [H st+1,fgg] and also that
the decision-maker exhibits the preference
(c,[H st+1,ff g])t (c,[H st+1,fgg]). (19)
Thisrankingsuggeststhatfromtheexanteperspectiveofperiodt,shepreferstoendup
with f rather than with g conditional on st+1, and in particular, that she prefers f to be
chosenfromff ,ggconditionalonst+1. Whethersheanticipates f actuallybeingchosen
fromff ,ggisthenrevealedbyherrankingof(c,[H st+1,ff ,gg])and(c,[H st+1,fgg]). For
instance, if
(c,[H st+1,ff ,gg])t (c,[H st+1,fgg]), (20)
then she has a strict preference for f being available ex post, which reveals that she
anticipates choosing f from ff ,gg at t +1. On the other hand, if she is indifferent to f
being available ex post, that is,
(c,[H st+1,ff ,gg])t (c,[H st+1,fgg]), (21)
then she anticipates a weak preference at t +1 for choosing g from ff ,gg. To see this,
observe that given (19), (21) implies (18), which in turn implies that g is tempting. Thus,Theoretical Economics 3 (2008) Non-Bayesian updating: a theoretical framework 209
theindifferencein(21)impliesthatsheexpectseithertosubmitto g,ortobeindifferent
between submitting to g and resisting it. That is, she anticipates a weak preference for
g at t +1.
Discussionof(20)–(21)revolvedaroundwhatthedecision-makeranticipatesattime
t about her choices at time t + 1. The next axiom connects her time t expectations
regarding future behavior and her actual future behavior.
Axiom 5 (Sophistication). If (c,[G st+1,ff g])t (c,[G st+1,fgg]), then
(c,[G st+1,ff ,gg])t (c,[G st+1,fgg])() f t+1 g,
where t and t+1 correspond to histories (s1,...,st) and (s1,...,st,st+1) respectively.
The axiom states that she is sophisticated in that her expectations are correct (at
least for anticipated choices out of binary menus ff ,gg). To see this, start by taking f ,
g such that in period t she would prefer to commit to f rather than g conditionally
on st+1 (as in the hypothesis). As in the earlier discussion, this relationship between f
and g allows us to deduce her expected t +1 choice out of ff ,gg from her t-ranking
of (c,[G st+1,ff ,gg]) and (c,[G st+1,fgg]). Her actual choice out of ff ,gg is given by her
t+1-ranking of f and g. The axiom states that the decision-maker expects to choose f
at t +1 if and only if she in fact chooses f at t +1.
Someaxiomsbelowinvolvetheevaluationofstreamsoflotteries(orlotterystreams),
and it is convenient to introduce relevant notation at this point. Any risky consumption
stream for the time period [t + 1,1), that is, where a unique (independent of states)
consumption level c is prescribed for each t +1, may be identiﬁed with an element
ofCt+1Ct+2.... Denote by Lt+1 the subset of all such risky consumption streams; a
generic element is `=(`)1
=t+1.
In order to obtain meaningful probabilities, a form of state independence is needed.
Axiom 6 (State Independence). Forall st+1,contingentmenus F inCt+1 and`0,`2Lt+1,
(c,f`0g)t (c,f`g)()(c,[F st+1,f`0g])t (c,[F st+1,f`g]).
The axiom states that the ranking of the lottery streams `0 and ` received uncondi-
tionallydoesnotchangeiftheyarereceivedconditionallyonanyspeciﬁcst+1 obtaining.
Thus time preferences and risk attitudes are not state-dependent.
In our model, temptation arises only because of a change in beliefs. This is reﬂected
in the next axiom.18
Axiom 7 (Restricted Strategic Rationality (RSR)). For all states st+1,st+2, consumption






18As in Sophistication, the preferences t and t+1 correspond to histories (s1,...,st) and (s1,...,st,st+1)




Suppose that, on observing st+1, the agent at t + 1 has to choose from the menu
f(c,H0),(c,H)g where H0(s0
t+2) = H(s0
t+2) for all s0
t+2 6= st+2 for some st+2. Since H0 and
H differ only in the single state st+2, their ranking does not depend on beliefs overSt+2:
there are no trade-offs across states that must be made. Consequently, there is no temp-
tation when choosing out of f(c,H0),(c,H)g, and, therefore, conditional on any st+1, the
agent never exhibits a preference for commitment. In particular, her preference t sat-
isﬁes a form of strategic rationality. This is the content of the implication ‘(22)=)(23)’.
The implication ‘(22)=)(24)’ is another expression of the absence of temptation: if the
t +1 choice between the prospects (c,H0) and (c,H) is not subject to temptation, then
there is no reason for her t +1 perspective to deviate from her prior, time t perspective
regarding the two prospects. The latter perspective is revealed by (22), the agent’s time
t preference for committing to (c,H0) versus (c,H) conditionally on st+1.
The ﬁnal axiom places structure on the agent’s preferences over lottery streams.
Axiom 8 (Risk Preference). There exist 0 <  < 1 and u : C  ! R1 nonconstant, linear
and continuous, such that, for each `0 and ` in Lt+1,








The axiomatic characterization of the utility function over streams of lotteries ap-
pearing in (8) is well known (see Epstein 1983, for example). Because time and risk pref-
erences are not our primary focus, we content ourselves with the statement of the above
unorthodox ‘axiom.’
Say that (,u,p0,(t,pt,qt)1tT) represents (t) if 0 is represented by U0() and, for
each t >0, t is represented by tUt()+(1 t)Vt(), where these functions are deﬁned
in (5)–(7) and where u,,p0, and (t,pt,qt)t1 satisfy the properties stated there. For
any c 2Ct+1 and M Ct+1, write (c,M) instead of fcgM 2M(Ct+1 Ct+1).
Theorem 1. If the process of preferences (t) satisﬁes Axioms 1–8, then there exists some










Then equations (5)–(7) admit a unique solution (Ut), where Ut(,st
1) : M(C C)  ! R1
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Deﬁne Ut(,st
1) and Vt(,st
1) by (5)–(6) and let 0 be represented by U0(), and, for each
t >0, let t be represented by tUt()+(1 t)Vt(). Then (t) satisﬁes Axioms (1)–(8).




t)t1) both represent (t),






t =tpt +(1 t)qt for t >0.
If t and st+1 are such that
(F st+1,(c,M0))t (F st+1,(c,M0 [M)) (26)




The restriction (25) implies that the recursion (7) deﬁnes a contraction mapping
which then yields a unique solution. The second part of the theorem deals with unique-
ness. Absolute uniqueness of all components is not to be expected. For example, if
t+1(st+1)=0, then every measure qt+1(jst+1) leads to the same st+1-conditional pref-
erence; similarly, ifqt+1(jst+1)=pt+1(jst+1), then t+1(st+1) is of no consequence and
hence indeterminate. These degenerate cases constitute precisely the circumstances
under which st+1-conditional preference is strategically rational, which is what is ex-
cluded by condition (26). Once strategic rationality is excluded, the strong uniqueness
property in (27) obtains.
4.2 Foundations for prior-bias and sample-bias
The specializations prior-bias and sample-bias introduced in Section 3 are character-
ized here (we use upper case names for the axioms corresponding to each bias).
It is convenient to deﬁne the preference tjst+1 on M(Ct+1 Ct+1) by
M tjst+1 M0 ()(c,[H st+1,M])t (c,[H st+1,M0])
for some (c,H) 2 Ct  Ct; the additive separability of the representation ensures
that the choice of (c,H) is irrelevant. For any (ct+1,Ft+1) 2 Ct+1  Ct+1, denote by
(c,f(ct+1,Ft+1)g) the alternative that yields immediate consumption c and a contingent
menu that commits the agent to (ct+1,Ft+1) in every state st+1. Evidently, the evalua-
tion of any such prospect reﬂects marginal beliefs aboutSt+2 held at time t, that is, the
agent’s period t prior on St+2. Say that st+1 is a neutral signal if, for all ct,ct+1 2 C and
Ft+1,Gt+1 2Ct+1,
f(ct+1,Ft+1)gtjst+1 f(ct+1,Gt+1)g() (ct,f(ct+1,Ft+1)g)t (ct,f(ct+1,Gt+1)g).
Given our representation, st+1 is a neutral signal if and only if pt+1(st+2 j st+1) = R
pt+1(st+2 js0
t+1)dmt(s0
t+1) for all st+2.212 Epstein, Noor, and Sandroni Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)
Axiom 9 (Prior-Bias). Letst+1 2St+1 andsupposethatforc 2Ct+1 and Ft+1,Gt+1 2Ct+1,
f(c,Ft+1)gtjst+1 f(c,Gt+1)g. (28)




To interpret the axiom, we suppress the ﬁxed consumption ct and ct+1 (and do the
same for interpretations in the sequel). Condition (28) states that at time t, the agent
strictly prefers to commit to F rather than to G conditionally on st+1. There are two
situations in which she would not be tempted by G conditionally on st+1 at time t +1
(and thus not exhibit a preference for commitment (30)). The ﬁrst is when st+1 is a neu-
tral signal, and thus does not lead to any updating of the prior. The second is when
she is indifferent between F and G if they are received unconditionally (29), that is, if
prior beliefs about St+2 make both look equally attractive. That the presence of temp-
tation conditionally on st+1 depends not only on how F andG are ranked conditionally
but also on how attractive they were prior to the realization of st+1, indicates excessive
inﬂuence of prior beliefs at the updating stage (time t +1).
Prior-Bias begs the question what happens to temptation if the indifference in (29)
is not satisﬁed. We consider two alternative strengthenings of the axiom that provide
different answers.
Label by Positive Prior-Bias the axiom obtained when (29) is replaced by
(c0,f(c,F)g)t (c0,f(c,G)g).
This implies that G is tempting conditionally on st+1 only if it was more attractive ac-
cording to (time t) prior beliefs about St+2. An alternative, labeled Negative Prior-Bias,
is the axiom obtained when (29) is replaced by
(c0,f(c,F)g)t (c0,f(c,G)g).
In this case, G is preferred at time t, but the signal st+1 reverses the ranking in favor of
F. Thus st+1 is a strong positive signal for F. The agent is greatly inﬂuenced by signals.
Thus she is not tempted byG after seeing st+1.
Corollary 1. Suppose that (t) has a representation (,u,p0,(t,pt,qt)t1). Then (t)
satisﬁes Prior-Bias if and only if it admits a representation satisfying (8) for some adapted
process (t) with t+1  1. Further, (t) satisﬁes (i) Positive Prior-Bias or (ii) Negative
Prior-Bias if and only if (8) is satisﬁed with respectively (i) 0t+1 1 and (ii) t+1 0.19
19The proofs of this corollary and of the one to follow are similar to the proof of Epstein (2006, Corollary
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Sample-bias can be characterized along the same lines. We need some additional
notation: denote by 	t+1 the empirical frequency measure on S given the history
st+1
1 . For any G in Ct+1, G(st+2) is a subset of Ct+2  Ct+2 and so is the mixture R
G(s0






t+2)s d	t+1 to every st+2. Then (ct+1,
R
Gd	t+1) denotes an alternative that
yields the obvious singleton menu.
The axioms to follow parallel the trio of axioms just stated. One difference is that the
contingent menus F and G appearing in these axioms are assumed, for reasons given
below, to lie in C
c,+1
t+1  Ct+1. Thus F and G provide perfect commitment and are such
that all relevant uncertainty is resolved by t +2. In this setting, say that st+1 is a neutral
















The right-hand side can be interpreted as saying that the sample st+1
1 makes F look
more attractive thanG: F delivers F(st+2) in state st+2 and st+2 appears with frequency
	t+1(st+2) in the sample. Thus ‘on average’, F yields
R
Fd	t+1. But the agent is indiffer-
ent between F and its average because she satisﬁes Independence. Thus the right-hand
sidein (31)implies that, under	t+1, theaverage for F isbetter thanthat ofG. Thus fora
neutral signalst+1, F is more attractivethanG under commitment (conditional onst+1)
if and only if F is more attractive thanG on average under the sample history. Given our
representation, st+1 is a neutral signal if and only if pt+1(st+2 j st+1) = 	t+1(st+2 j st+1)
for all st+2.



















The next two axioms provide alternative strengthenings of Sample-Bias. Label by
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WenowinterpretPositiveSample-Bias; theotherinterpretationsaresimilar. Theax-
iom asserts that if commitment to F is preferred (conditionally on st+1) to commitment
toG, and if the sample makes F look more attractive thanG, or if st+1 is neutral, thenG
is not tempting conditionally. The fact that the sample may inﬂuence temptation after
realization of st+1, above and beyond its role in the conditional ranking, reveals the ex-
cessive inﬂuence of the sample at the updating stage. The inﬂuence is ‘positive’ because
G can be tempting conditionally only if it was more attractive according to the sample
history.
The preceding intuition, speciﬁcally the indifference between F and
R
Fd	t+1
posited when interpreting (31), relies on F lying in C
c,+1
t+1 . That is because as st+2 varies,
not only does F(st+2) vary but so also does the information upon which the agent bases
evaluation of the menu F(st+2). Independence implies indifference to the former varia-
tion but not to the latter. For F in C
c,+1
t+1 , however, information is irrelevant because all
uncertainty is resolved once st+2 is realized.
Corollary 2. Suppose that (t) has a representation (,u,p0,(t,pt,qt)t1). Then (t)
satisﬁes Sample-Bias if and only if it admits a representation satisfying (10) for some
adapted process (t) with t+1  1. Further, (t) satisﬁes (i) Positive Sample-Bias or
(ii) Negative Sample-Bias if and only if (10) is satisﬁed with respectively (i) 0  t+1  1
and (ii) t+1 0.
Appendix
A. Contingent menus
The construction of the space of contingent menus is analogous to familiar construc-
tions of type spaces (Mertens and Zamir 1985 and Brandenburger and Dekel 1993), and
to related constructions in Epstein and Wang (1996) and Gul and Pesendorfer (2004).
The difﬁculty arises from a problem of inﬁnite regress. In the context of type spaces, the
solution is to employ suitable hierarchies of spaces of probability measures. Here and in
the other studies cited, hierarchies of alternative topological spaces are used. The tech-
nical details are now well understood and thus we omit a formal proof for the theorem
that follows.20 The properties of the space of contingent menus spelled out in the the-
orem are invoked in proving our main representation result Theorem 1. Readers who
are not interested in that proof and who are willing to accept the intuitive description of
contingent menus provided in the discussion leading to (3) may skip this section of the
appendix entirely.
Deﬁne the following spaces:
D1 =[M(C C1)]S
Dt =[M(C Dt 1)]S for t >1.
20When S is a singleton, a contingent menu is simply a menu, hence a closed subset, and the proof is a
corollary of Epstein and Wang (1996, Theorem 6.1). See also Epstein and Peters (1999, Appendix B), which
deals with hierarchies of upper-semicontinuous functions taking values in [0,1]; the indicator function of
a closed set is such a function, hence the relevance to hierarchies of closed sets.Theoretical Economics 3 (2008) Non-Bayesian updating: a theoretical framework 215
For interpretation, G in D1 yields the set G(s) of consumption streams if s is realized
at t = 1. Thus think of G as a contingent menu for which there is no uncertainty and
no ﬂexibility (in the sense of nonsingleton menus) after time 1. Similarly, G in Dt can
be thought of as a contingent menu for which there is no uncertainty or ﬂexibility after
time t.
Each Dt is compact metric. In addition, there is a natural mixing operation on each
Dt: given any space X where mixtures x +(1 )y are well deﬁned, mix elements of
M(X) by
M +(1 )N =fx +(1 )y :x 2M,y 2Ng.
Mixtures are deﬁned in the obvious way on X =C1. On D1 deﬁne G0 +(1 )G by
(G0 +(1 )G)(s)=G(s)+(1 )G(s).
Proceed inductively for all Dt.
Theorem A.1. There exists C 1
1 Dt such that
(i) C is compact metric under the induced product topology.
(ii) C is homeomorphic to [M(C C)]S.
(iii) Under a suitable identiﬁcation,
Dt 1 Dt C.
(iv) Let t be the projection map from 1
1 Dt into Dt. Then t(C)C and
t(F)  !
t !1
F for every F in C.
(v) Let F0 = (G0
t) and F = (Gt) be in C. Then (G0
t +(1 )Gt) is an element of C,
denoted F0 +(1 )F. Under the homeomorphism in (i),
(F0 +(1 )F)(s)
=f(c0 +(1 )c,H0 +(1 )H):(c0,H0)2 F0(s),(c,H)2 F(s)g.
Part (i) asserts that the topological structure of C is inherited by C. Part (ii) is the
homeomorphism (3) used in the text.
We note above that each G in Dt implies no uncertainty or ﬂexibility after time t.
Think of such a G as a special contingent menu in which all uncertainty and ﬂexibility
beyond t have been somehow collapsed into period t. Then (iii) and (iv) imply that the
set [1
1 Dt of all such special contingent menus is dense in C.
Part (v) provides the mixing operation promised in Section 4. Roughly it shows that
‘’, which is the natural mixing operation induced by 1
1 Dt on C, is consistent with that
suggested by the homeomorphism in (ii). Thus, there is no danger of confusion and in
the text we have written simply F0 +(1 )F rather than F0 +(1 )F.216 Epstein, Noor, and Sandroni Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)
Finally, deﬁne the spaces C c,+1 C c C introduced in Section 2.3. First, C c is the




under the homeomorphism in the theorem. (Details are as in Epstein and Wang 1996,
Theorem 6.1(a).) Take C c,+1 =(C C1)S.
B. Proof of main representation result
B.1 Necessity of the axioms
Denote by X the set of all processes U = (Ut), where Ut(,st


































Then   is a contraction under assumption (25) and thus has a unique ﬁxed point (Ut).
It is a routine matter to verify the axioms.
B.2 Preliminaries for sufﬁciency
ForanycompactmetricspaceD endowedwithacontinuousmixtureoperation,saythat
a preference  over M(D) has a (U,V) representation if the functions U,V : D ! R are






Say that  is strategically rational if for all M,M0 2M(D),
M M0 =)M M [M0.
Lemma B.1. If  has a (U,V) representation withU nonconstant, then
(i)  is strategically rational if and only if V =aU +b for some a 0. In particular, if
V is nonconstant then  is strategically rational if and only if U +V = aV +b for
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(ii)  is strategically rational if and only if for all c,c 2D,
fcgfcg=)fcgfc,cg. (B.1)
Proof. (i) The argument is similar to Gul and Pesendorfer (2001, p. 1414).
(ii) Sufﬁciency is clear. For necessity, suppose that  is not strategically rational so
that, as in Gul and Pesendorfer (2001, p. 1414),U and V are nonconstant andU is not a
positive afﬁne transformation of V. Consequently, there exist c,c 2 D such that either
[U(c) >U(c0) and V(c)  V(c0)], or [U(c) U(c0) and V(c) < V(c0)]. Linearity and non-
constancy ofU and V imply the existence of c and c close to c and c0, respectively, such
that all inequalities are strict. Then
fcgfcg and fcgfc,cg,
which violates (B.1) and yields the result. 
Lemma B.2. Suppose that  has a (U,V) representation and that there exist c,c such that
fc,cg  fcg. Then a preference  over D is represented by U +V if and only if it satisﬁes
the vNM axioms and the restriction
if fcgfdg, then fc,dgfdg()c  d.
For a proof of this result, see Noor (2008, Theorem 2.2). For any state st+2,G 2Ct+1,
and L M(Ct+2 Ct+2), deﬁne the set Lst+2G of contingent menus by
Lst+2G =f[G st+2,M]:M 2 LgCt+1.
Deﬁne tjst+1,st+2 on closed subsets of M(Ct+2 Ct+2) by L0 tjst+1,st+2 L if and only if
(c0,[F st+1,(c,L0st+2G)])t (c0,[F st+1,(c,Lst+2G)]),
for some c,c0 2C, F in Ct, andG in Ct+1.
Lemma B.3. Suppose that (t) satisﬁes Axioms 1–8 and that tjst+1,st+2 has a (U,V) repre-
sentation with nonconstant U. Then tjst+1,st+2 is strategically rational.







where the implication =) is by RSR. 
In the next lemma, t and t+1 are the preferences corresponding to histories
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Lemma B.4. Suppose that (t) satisﬁes Axioms 1–8. If H,H0 2 Ct+1 are such that
H(s0
t+2)=H0(s0
t+2) for all s0
t+2 6=st+2, then for any st+1,c,c0 and F,
(c,H)t+1 (c,H0)()(c0,[F st+1,f(c,H)g])t (c0,[F st+1,f(c,H0)g]).
Proof. (= follows from RSR. Conversely, suppose that (c,H) t+1 (c,H0) and
(c0,[F st+1,f(c,H0)g])t (c0,[F st+1,f(c,H)g]). Sophistication implies
(c0,[F st+1,f(c,H0),(c,H)g])t (c0,[F st+1,f(c,H)g]);
by Set-Betweenness, this weak preference is in fact indifference. Therefore,
(c0,[F st+1,f(c,H0)g])t (c0,[F st+1,f(c,H0),(c,H)g]),
which contradicts RSR. 
B.3 Sufﬁciency of the axioms
The proof of sufﬁciency begins by establishing the desired representation of 0 on
C DT  C C (see Appendix A). Later the representation of 0 is extended to all of
C C by letting T !1 and exploiting the denseness indicated in Theorem A.1(iv). The
desired representations for (t) follow.
Until speciﬁed otherwise, we derive a representation for the restriction of 0 to C 
DT, for given T > 0. The argument involves deriving, for each 0  t < T, an appro-
priate representation for the restriction of t to Ct DT t. This proceeds by backward






where  and u are provided by Risk Independence. We begin by showing that T 1 is




Ur(FT 1(sT))dmT 1, (cT 1, FT 1)2C D1, (B.2)
where mT 1 2(ST) and mT 1 has full support.
Identify (C C1)S with the obvious subset of M(C C1). We claim that the restric-
tion of T 1 to CT 1 (C C1)S may be represented by
WT 1(c,FT 1)=u1(c)+u2(FT 1), (B.3)
where u1() and u2() are continuous and linear. We argue as follows. Since CT 1 
(C C1)S is a mixture space and T 1 satisﬁes Order, Continuity, and Independence,
there exists a continuous linear representation WT 1() of T 1 on CT 1 (C C1)S. By





























Linearity and continuity of u1() and u2() are evident.





Ur(FT 1(sT))dmT 1, FT 1 2(C C1)S,
for some mT 1 2(ST). Take any c and deﬁne  on (C C1)S by
F G ()(c,F)T 1 (c,G). (B.4)
We verify that  satisﬁes the Anscombe–Aumann axioms. Order, Continuity, and In-
dependence are immediate. By Risk Preference and nonconstancy of u(), there exist
c0,c00 2 C such that for any ~ c 2 C1, (c0,~ c) 6 (c00,~ c), and thus  satisﬁes the Anscombe–
Aumann nondegeneracy condition. State Independence applied twice yields (F sT,c0)
(F sT,c00) =) (F s0
T,c0)  (F s0
T,c00) for all c0,c00 2 C and sT,s0
T 2 ST. Thus there exists
mT 1 2 (ST) and v : C C1  ! R, nonconstant, continuous, and linear, such that 




v(FT 1(sT))dmT 1, FT 1 2(C C1)S.
Since u2() is continuous, linear and (by (B.4)) ordinally equivalent to w(), it follows that
u2()=aw()+b for some a >0. By Risk Preference, it is without loss of generality to set
v(`)=
P1




Ur(FT 1(sT))dmT 1 +b, FT 1 2(C C1)S.
Again by Risk Preference, it is without loss of generality to set u1() = u(), a = , and
b = 0. State Independence, Risk Preference, and the nonconstancy of u() imply that
mT 1 has full support.
To complete the proof of (B.2), extend the representation WT 1() of T 1 on
CT 1  (C C1)S to CT 1  D1. We show that for every sT, the preference T 1jsT on
M(C C1) is strategically rational, that is, for any M,N 2M(C C1), M T 1jsT N im-
plies M T 1jsT M [N. Given Order, Continuity, Independence, and Set-Betweenness,
the preference T 1jsT has a (U,V) representation by Kopylov (2007); given Risk Prefer-
ence, State Independence, and Sophistication, T 1jsT is non-trivial in that there exists
f`,`0g 2 M(C C1) such that f`,`0g T 1jsT f`0g. By Risk Preference, the restriction of220 Epstein, Noor, and Sandroni Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)
T to C C1 is represented by the function ` 7 !
P1
0 u(`) and thus satisﬁes the
vNM axioms. So by Sophistication and Lemma B.2, U + V is ordinally equivalent to
`7 !
P1
0 u(`). But by State Independence and Risk Preference,U is ordinally equiv-
alent to ` 7 !
P1
0 u(`). Thus, V must be constant or ordinally equivalent to U. In
either case, T 1jsT must be strategically rational. Hence, for any M 2M(C C1), there
exists `2M that is T-maximal in M, and for any c, sT and H 2D1,
(c,[H sT,M])T 1 (c,[H sT,f`g]).
ThisallowsustoextendtherepresentationWT 1()ofT 1 onCT 1(CC1)S toCT 1
D1 in the appropriate manner, completing the proof of (B.2).
As the induction hypothesis, suppose that for some t < T and every  satisfying





where m+1 has full support, U+2(,s+2) : M(C+2 DT  2)  ! R1 is nonconstant,































and the boundary condition
UT 1(MT 1,sT)=Ur(MT 1), MT 1 2M(C C1).
Moreover,
+2 2(0,1], p+2,q+2 2(S+2), each p+2 has full support,
and m+2 =+2p+2 +(1 +2)q+2.
We construct Wt having the appropriate form and representing t.21 The argument
is divided into a series of steps.
21For t = 0, the measure m0 over S1 that we construct can be denoted instead by p0, as in the desired
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Step 1. Deﬁne the “convex hull” of contingent menus.
Foranymixturespace,wehavetheusualnotionofconvexhullofasetM—thesmall-
est convex (mixture-closed) set containing M. However, a mixture space framework is
not adequate because, for example, M(CT CT) is not a mixture space: [0M +(1 
0)M0]+(1 )M0 6= 0M +(1 0)M0 if M and M0 are not convex . More generally,
because M +(1 )M 6=M in general, the “convex hull” of any M need not contain M.
In fact, we are interested in the convex hull of contingent menus. Thus we deﬁne co(Ft)
for any Ft in Ct and we do so by backward induction.
Since CT C1 is a mixture space, the “convex hull of MT 1 2 M(CT C1)” has the
usual meaning—the smallest convex set containing MT 1. For any contingent menu





Then D1 is a mixture space.




is a mixture space. Let Ft 2DT t, st+1 2St+1, and
N =f(ct+1,co(Ft+1)):(ct+1,Ft+1)2 Ft(st+1)g.
Since Ct+1  DT t 1 is a mixture space, the smallest convex subset of Ct+1  DT t 1
containing N is well-deﬁned. We deﬁne co(Ft)(st+1) to be that set. This deﬁnes co(Ft).
Note that it lies in DT t =fco(F0
t ): F0
t 2DT tg, and that the latter is a mixture space.
Step 2. Each t satisﬁes Indifference to Randomization, that is,
(c,Ft)t (c,co(Ft)). (B.5)
Proof. For t =T  1, sinceC C1 is a mixture space, the preference T 1 restricted to
CT 1D1 =CT 1(M(C C1))ST satisﬁes IR by Order, Continuity, and Independence
(see Dekel et al. 2001, Lemma 1).22
However, Ct DT t is not a mixture space if t < T  1. Fortunately, we can invoke
Kopylov (2007) to prove (B.5).23 He extends the GP theorem to a domain, consisting of
hierarchies of menus, that corresponds to our setting when the state spaceS is a single-
ton and when consumption occurs only at the terminal time. His arguments are readily
adapted to accommodate the multiplicity of states and the presence of intermediate
consumption. Ã
22Their result is formulated for preference deﬁned on menus of lotteries, but the same argument can be
used for menus of any compact metric mixture space. The contingent nature of menus in our case is of no
signiﬁcance because mixtures are deﬁned statewise.
23We are grateful to Igor Kopylov for pointing out this line of argument.222 Epstein, Noor, and Sandroni Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)









t+1(,st+1) are nonconstant, continuous, and linear on Ct and
M(Ct+1 DT t 1) respectively, and where
U
t+1(M,st+1)=U
t+1(co(M),st+1) for M 2M(Ct+1 DT t 1). (B.7)
Proof. To prove this, restrict attention ﬁrst to Ct DT t. Each F in DT t maps St+1
into M c(Ct+1  DT t 1), the collection of convex (and closed) subsets of the mixture
space Ct+1 DT t 1. But M c(Ct+1 DT t 1) is a mixture space. Since t satisﬁes Or-
der, Continuity, and Independence onCt DT t, it admits a utility representation there
by some c Wt : Ct DT t ! R1 having the form (B.6); additivity across c and F can be
established as in (B.3), while the additive separability across states follows as in Kreps
(1988, Propn. 7.4), for example. Use (B.7) to extend (B.6) to all ofCt DT t. Indifference
to Randomization (Step 2) implies that c Wt() represents t on Ct DT t. Ã
Let tjst+1 on M(Ct+1 DT t 1) be the preference represented byU
t+1(,st+1).
Step 4. tjst+1 satisﬁes the GP axioms suitably translated to M(Ct+1 DT t 1).
















The subscript t indicates that these functions may depend also on the history st
1 under-
lying t.













Proof. By Risk Preference and State Independence, for any c,H,st+1 there exist `,`0 2
Lt+1 such that
(c,[H st+1,f`g])t (c,[H st+1,f`0g]) and `t+1 `0.
24GPworkwithadomainofmenusoflotteries. Theirtheoremwouldapplydirectlyifwehadadoptedthe
larger domain obtained by replacing (4) with Ft :St+1  ! M((Ct+1 DT t 1)). However, adding an extra
layer of lotteries can be avoided by invoking Kopylov, suitably extended to accommodate a ﬁnite (nonsin-
gleton) state space and intermediate consumption. (His Temporal Set-Betweenness axiom is satisﬁed by
our preference tjst+1, by Lemma B.4 and Set-Betweenness.)Theoretical Economics 3 (2008) Non-Bayesian updating: a theoretical framework 223
It follows from Sophistication that
(c,[H st+1,f`,`0g])t (c,[H st+1,f`0g]).
In particular, the preference tjst+1 on M(Ct+1 DT t 1) satisﬁes f`,`0g tjst+1 f`0g. By
Step 4 this preference has a (UGP
t+1,VGP
t+1) representation, and thus by Sophistication,
Order, Continuity, and Independence for t+1, Lemma B.2 implies that UGP
t+1(,st+1) +
VGP
t+1(,st+1) represents t+1. By the induction hypothesis, t+1 is represented also by
Wt+1(), and since both functions are continuous and linear, they must be cardinally
equivalent. Thus (B.8) follows. Ã






where wt+1(,st+1) and each vt+1(,st+1,st+2) are continuous and linear on Ct+1 and
M(Ct+2 DT t 2) respectively.
Proof. The function M 7 !Vt+1(c,[F st+2,M],st+1) gives the (temptation) utility of the
indicatedconsumptionandcontingentmenupairasafunctionofthemenuM provided
















for any closed L  M(Ct+2  DT t 2). By Risk Preference, State Independence, and
Lemma B.4, Ut+1(c,[F st+2,],st+1) is nonconstant, and so by Lemma B.3, tjst+1,st+2 is
strategically rational. By Lemma B.1(i), if Vt+1(c,[F st+2,],st+1) is nonconstant then it is
ordinally equivalent toUt+1(c,[F st+2,],st+1)+Vt+1(c,[F st+2,],st+1), which by Step 5 is
ordinally equivalent to Ut+2(,st+2). Thus, if Vt+1(c,[F st+2,],st+1) is nonconstant, then




()Vt+1(c,[F st+2,co(M)],st+1)Vt+1(c,[F st+2,co(M0)],st+1),224 Epstein, Noor, and Sandroni Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)
where use has been made of (B.7). On the other hand, if Vt+1(c,[F st+2,],st+1) is con-
stant, then the equivalence of the ﬁrst and last lines is clear. We conclude that for every
F, c, and st+2,
Vt+1(c,[F st+2,M],st+1)=Vt+1(c,[F st+2,co(M)],st+1).
Repeated application of this equality for all states inSt+2 yields
Vt+1(c,F,st+1)=Vt+1(c,co(F),st+1),
a form of indifference to randomization for Vt+1. Thus one can argue as in Step 3 to
derive (B.9). Ã













for some a(st+1,st+2)  0. Given (B.9), we can reﬁne (B.10) into the statement
that if vt+1(,st+1,st+2) is nonconstant, then vt+1(,st+1,st+2) is ordinally equivalent to
Ut+2(,st+2). Given continuity and linearity of both functions, (B.11) holds for some
a(st+1,st+2)>0. If vt+1(,st+1,st+2) is constant, then (B.11) holds with a(st+1,st+2)=0.





















b(st+1,st+2). Set k =0 without loss of generality. Ã
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Proof. By Risk Preference and State Independence, UGP








































Since u() is nonconstant, we have (1   t+1(st+1)) = (st+1) and wt+1(`t+1,st+1) =
(1 t+1(st+1))u(`t+1). If (st+1) = 0, then  > 0 implies wt+1(`t+1,st+1) = 0, which
yields (B.12) with t+1(st+1) = 1. On the other hand, if (st+1) > 0, then  > 0 implies
(B.12) with t+1(st+1)<1. Ã
Step 9. The unique measure pt+1 overSt+2 satisfying mt+1 =t+1pt+1+(1 t+1)qt+1 is










Proof. Steps 5 and 8 yield (B.13), given that pt+1 satisﬁes mt+1 = t+1pt+1+
(1 t+1)qt+1. We show next that pt+1 is a probability measure with full support. The
deﬁnition of pt+1 implies that
P
st+2
pt+1(st+2) = 1. To see that pt+1(st+2) > 0 for all st+2,








where the equivalence () is implied by Lemma B.4. Ã226 Epstein, Noor, and Sandroni Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)
Step 10. Complete the inductive step.
Since At(st+1)t+1(st+1) > 0 for all st+1, we have
P
st+1 At(st+1)t+1(st+1) > 0. Con-




































>0 for each st+1.




































It remains to show that ut+1() = u(). By Risk Preference and the representation
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Since both are continuous linear functions, they must be cardinally equivalent. An ar-
gument analogous to that used in Step 8 yields the desired result, and completes the
inductive step.
We now have a representation for 0 on C DT for each T. It remains to extend the
representation to C C. Note that DT  DT+1 for each T. Thus each representation on
C DT+1 induces a representation also on C DT. We proceed by showing: (i) consis-
tency of the representations of 0 obtained above, (ii) a (unique) continuous extension
to C C, and (iii) the extension has the appropriate functional form (5)–(7). The last
step simultaneously derives the desired representation of (t) via Lemma B.2.
To show (i), consider the representations (p0,(pt,qt,t)T






0 onCDT andCDT+1, respectively. Weneedtoshowthatp0 =p0
0 andforall0<t 
T, pt = p0
t, qt = q0
t, and t = 0
t. This can be proved by adapting the argument used in
Epstein (2006, Corollary 3.3). The uniqueness part of the Anscombe–Aumann theorem
ensures p0 = p0
0. Further, if 0 exhibits a preference for commitment conditional on a
history of length t  1  T, then it must be that pt = p0
t,qt = q0
t, and t = 0
t. If there
is no such preference for commitment, then the non-uniqueness of the representation
permits us to set pt = p0
t,qt = q0
t, and t = 0
t without loss of generality. Proceeding
in this way, we obtain (p0,(pt,qt,t)1
1 ) such that 0 has the desired representation W0 :
C [1
1 DT !R.
For (ii), we exploit the denseness indicated in Theorem A.1(iv). First, observe
that W0() is bounded above by W0(`) = (1   ) 1maxc2C u(c) and below by W0(`) =
(1 ) 1minc2C u(c), and in particular, each (c,F) 2C C is ranked between the risky
streams `,` 2 L. By Continuity and Risk Preference it follows that each (c,F) 2 C C
is indifferent to some unique mixture of `,`, which we denote by `(c,F)` 2 L. Since
L  C  [1
1 DT, this allows us to deﬁne an extension of W0() to all of C  C by set-
ting W0(c,F) = W0(`(c,F)`). To see that this extension is continuous, without loss of
generality let W0(`) = 1 and W0(`) = 0 so that in fact W0(c,F) = (c,F) and suppose
(cn,Fn) ! (c,F) and, by way of contradiction, (cn,Fn) 6! (c,F). Then for some "-ball
B((c,F),") around (c,F), there are inﬁnitely many n such that (cn,Fn) 62 B((c,F),"). Let
(cm,Fm) denote the corresponding subsequence and note that (cm,Fm) ! (c,F). Since
f(cm,Fm)g isasubsequenceintheunit interval, ithasaconvergentsubsequencef(ci,Fi)g
with a limit different from (c,F); denote by (ci,Fi) the corresponding subsequence of
(cm,Fm). Then Continuity implies that (c,F)=lim(ci,Fi)lim`(ci,Fi)`6=`(c,F)`. How-
ever, (c,F)  `(c,F)` for a unique (c,F), a contradiction. Thus we have a continuous
extension of W0() to C C. Since the latter is compact, the extension is uniformly con-
tinuous and unique.
For (iii), uniform continuity of W0 is the key. It implies uniform continuity ofU1(,s1)
on M(C  [1
1 DT), and also of U1() and V1() on C  [1
1 DT; as a result the latter two
functions can be extended uniquely to continuous functions on C C. Argue induc-
tively. The details are tedious but straightforward.
This completes the proof of sufﬁciency. The proof for uniqueness is similar to that
in Epstein (2006), and thus is omitted.228 Epstein, Noor, and Sandroni Theoretical Economics 3 (2008)
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